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Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), along with John Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice (1971), radically changed the landscape in analytic political philosophy. For much of the 
preceding half-century, under the influence of logical positivism’s heavy emphasis on empirical 
verifiability, much of moral philosophy was taken up with meta-ethics (e.g., the semantics of 
moral discourse)—with little attention given to normative moral theories. Moreover, to the extent 
that normative theories were considered, utilitarianism was the center of attention. This all 
changed with the publication of Rawls’s articulation and defense of liberal egalitarianism and 
Nozick’s libertarian challenge to the legitimacy of anything more than the night-watchman state. 
 At the core of Nozick’s book are two arguments. One is that a night-watchman state 
(which protects only against violence, theft, fraud, and breach of contract) could be legitimate, 
even without the consent of all those to be governed. The other is that nothing more extensive 
than the night-watchman state is legitimate, except with the consent of all. The argument is 
complex, and Nozick often inserts long—and very interesting—digressions. Below I shall focus 
only on his core argument. I shall thus not address his discussions of Rawls’ theory of justice 
(Ch. 7, Section 2) and other arguments attempting to justify more than the night-watchman state 
(Ch. 8), nor his discussion of utopias (Ch. 10). 
 
1. The Anarchist Challenge 
Nozick attempts to rebut anarchism, which comes in several shapes and forms. The strongest 
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version says that it is impossible for any state to be legitimate. Almost everyone finds this view 
implausible because a state seems perfectly legitimate when, for example, it efficiently and fairly 
promotes individual wellbeing and all those governed by it have given, under fair conditions, 
their free and informed consent to it. A weaker version of anarchism—moderate anarchism—
holds that a state is morally illegitimate unless all those governed by it have given appropriate 
consent. Relative to many theories of political morality—such as utilitarianism and 
(hypothetical) contractarianism—even this moderate version of anarchism is implausible. A 
version of utilitarianism, for example, can hold that a state is legitimate if it maximizes the total 
wellbeing in society (compared with other social arrangements). Consent and rights of self-
defense play no special role in this theory of political justification. Nozick, however, starts with a 
libertarian theory of individual rights in which consent and rights of self-defense play very 
significant roles. In the context of such a theory (which we will examine below), the moderate 
anarchist position seems quite compelling. Nozick, however, argues that even here it is mistaken. 
He argues that the state can be legitimate even without unanimous consent. If his argument is 
successful, it is a very significant result. 
 Before considering Nozick’s argument, we need to get clearer on what a state is and on 
his libertarian theory of justice. 
 
2. The State 
Defining statehood is no easy matter, and there is no uncontroversial comprehensive definition. 
Something like the following, however, seems at least roughly right for our purposes: A state is a 
rule-of-law-based coercive organization that, for a given territory, effectively rules all individuals in 
it and claims a monopoly on the use of force (e.g., killing, maiming, or inflicting pain). This can be 
unpacked as follows: A state is a coercive organization in that it threatens to use force against 
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individuals who do not comply with its dictates (either via prior restraint to prevent non-compliance 
or via punishment or the extraction of compensation for non-compliance) and it generally 
implements its threats. A state is rule-of-law-based in that in general it uses force only for violation 
of public and proactive dictates (and not on the whim of its officials). A state effectively rules the 
individuals of a given territory in that those individuals generally obey its dictates. A state claims a 
monopoly on the use of force in that it prohibits the use of force (or credible threat thereof) without 
its permission. 
 The rule of law requirement is controversial, and, in any case, Nozick does not invoke it 
explicitly. He characterizes the state as a coercive organization that has, for a given territory, an 
effective monopoly on the use of force.1 This is at least roughly equivalent to the definition given 
above, if we assume, as we shall, that (1) the rule of law requirement is either met or irrelevant, and 
(2) a coercive organization has an effective monopoly on the use of force in a given territory 
(roughly) if and only if it claims a monopoly on the use of the force in that territory and effectively 
rules that territory. 
 The (moderate) anarchist claim is thus that no coercive organization that exercises an 
effective monopoly on the use of force over a given territory is legitimate unless all those 
governed by it have consented to its rule. It is worth noting here that the claim concerns 
legitimacy—as opposed to authority. A state is legitimate just in case its use of force (and threat 
thereof) is typically morally permissible. A state has authority just in case individuals in its 
territory typically have at least an all-else-being-equal moral obligation to obey its dictates. 
Ideally, a state should have both features, but in principle, a state could be legitimate even if it 
has no political authority (and vice-versa). Following Nozick, we shall focus on the legitimacy of 
the state. 
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3. Libertarianism and Justice 
Nozick argues that a state can be legitimate even without the consent of those governed. He does 
this on the basis of certain principles of justice. In the philosophical literature, the term “justice” 
is used in several different ways, but Nozick understands it as the permissible use of force.2 So 
understood, justice is not concerned with all of one’s moral obligations. It only concerns the 
moral restrictions on the use of force. The legitimacy of a state is thus a matter of its actions 
being just. 
 Nozick holds a kind of libertarian theory of justice, which we shall consider below. We 
shall start, however, by considering some more general aspects of his theory of justice. First, he 
holds that normal adult humans have certain strong natural rights—including the right to bodily 
integrity (which prohibits killing, torturing, or maiming the right-holder). These rights are natural 
in the sense that they do not depend on any legal or social conventions. All individuals having 
the requisite features—roughly, the ability to make free and rational choices in accordance with 
some reflectively chosen conception of the good life—have these rights. The rights are strong in 
the sense that they are not easily overridden by other moral considerations. Indeed, Nozick 
believes that these rights are nearly absolute: they may not be infringed except perhaps when 
necessary and effective in avoiding a great social catastrophe. Positing natural rights is not 
uncontroversial. Act-consequentialists (such as act-utilitarians) deny that there are any natural 
rights. Nonetheless, most people would acknowledge that there are some natural rights, and that 
the right to bodily integrity is among them. 
 A final general point to note about Nozick’s theory of justice is that it is historical. What 
it is just to do depends in part on what happened in the past. It is not normally just to punch 
another in the face, but it may be if it is part of a consensual boxing match. Likewise, it is not 
normally just to lock someone in a room, but it may be so if that person murdered several people 
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in the past. Both past consent and past wrongdoings are relevant to what is just at a given time. 
This aspect of Nozick’s theory is highly plausible, and his emphasis on this feature has had a 
very positive impact on theorizing about justice. It’s worth noting, however, that a theory can be 
historical (i.e., sensitive to the past) without being purely historical (i.e., making the future 
consequences irrelevant).  
 Nozick’s theory of justice is a property-rights based theory. He claims that individuals 
have, or can acquire, full property rights (or full ownership) over various things, where full 
property rights over a thing consist (roughly) of (1) the right to use and control use of the thing 
by others,3 (2) the right to compensation from those who have violated one’s rights in the thing, 
(3) the right to use force to stop those who are about to violate one’s rights in the thing, to extract 
compensation from those who have already violated such rights, and perhaps to punish such 
offenders, (4) the right to transfer these rights to others, and (5) an immunity to losing any of 
these rights as long as one has not violated, and is not in the process of violating, the rights of 
others. 
 Nozick’s theory of justice is a libertarian theory, according to which an action is just if 
and only if it violates no libertarian rights, where the libertarian rights are the following: 
1) initial full self-ownership: each autonomous agent initially has full property rights in 
him/herself (paradigmatically rights of bodily integrity, which rule out killing or physically 
assaulting one without one’s permission); 4 
2) initial rights of common use of the external world: the right to use non-agent things (as long as 
this violates no one’s self-ownership); 
3) rights of initial acquisition: the right to acquire full property rights in unowned things as long 
as one leaves “enough and as good” for others; 
4) rights of acquisition by transfer: the right to acquire any property right in a thing held by 
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another by voluntary transfer. 
 This theory of justice is modeled on that of John Locke in Two Treatises of Government. 
Nozick does not systematically defend this theory, but he does provide motivation for its key 
aspects. The rights of self-ownership, he claims, “reflect the Kantian principle that individuals 
are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other 
ends without their consent” (pp. 30-31), “express the inviolability of others” (p. 32), and “reflect 
the fact of our separate existences” (p. 33). Although the core of full self-ownership—roughly 
the right, under normal circumstances, to be free of interferences with one’s body—seems highly 
plausible, many would reject some of the other rights included in full self-ownership. One could 
question, for example, whether this right holds even where the harm to the holder is slight and 
the benefit to others is great (e.g., a small prick to my finger saves the lives of many). One could 
also question whether one has the right to enslave oneself voluntarily (as full self-ownership 
asserts). 
 Nozick does not spend much time discussing initial rights of common use. He simply 
asserts that the non-agent world is initially unowned, and individuals are free to use any part of it 
when others are not. He (like Locke) rejects, for example, the view that the world—other than 
the self-owning agents—is initially owned by some individual or group of individuals. (Such a 
view was invoked by 17th century proponents of the “divine right of kings”—a doctrine which 
Locke vigorously rejected.) 
The right of initial acquisition is the power to acquire private property rights over things 
that are not already privately owned by others. Locke’s version of this right requires that one 
“mix one’s labor” with the thing and that one leave “enough and as good” for others.5 Nozick 
notes (pp. 174-75) that the content and significance of the labor-mixing metaphor is not clear: 
Does an astronaut who clears a plot on uninhabited Mars mix his labor with the plot, all of Mars, 
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or the entire uninhabited universe? Nozick never resolves this issue, but nothing significant is 
lost if we replace the labor-mixing requirement with the more general requirement that the 
individual stake a claim to the object in some appropriate manner (e.g., publicly declare/register 
that she is claiming ownership of the object). The crucial question concerns the other 
requirement, that “enough and as good” be left for others. Nozick calls this “the Lockean 
Proviso”. 
 The Lockean Proviso can be interpreted in different ways. Nozick interprets it to require 
that the situation of others not be worsened by the appropriation. More exactly, he interprets it to 
require that no one be worse off in overall wellbeing with the appropriation than he/she would if 
the appropriation were not to take place (i.e., if the object were to remain in common use). Given 
that common use is generally inefficient (e.g., because individuals don’t have sufficient 
incentives to preserve the resource), this interpretation of the proviso sets a low baseline and 
makes it relatively easy for individuals to acquire full private property in unappropriated things.6 
It’s worth noting here that there is disagreement within libertarian theory concerning the 
right to appropriate unappropriated things. Extreme right-libertarianism denies that there is any 
kind of requirement that enough and as good be left for others. It holds, for example, that the first 
person to discover, claim, or mix labor with an unowned object can thereby fully own it. 
Moderate (or Lockean) right-libertarianism holds that that some kind of Lockean Proviso must 
be satisfied, but interprets the proviso to be a weak requirement (e.g., as Nozick does). Equal 
Share Left-Libertarianism—advocated by Steiner (1994)—holds that the proviso applies and 
requires that one leave an equally valuable share of unappropriated resources for others (and thus 
allows one to appropriate only up to one’s per capita share of the value of unappropriated 
resources). Equal Opportunity for Wellbeing Left-Libertarianism—advocated by Otsuka 
(2003)—holds that the proviso applies and requires that one leave enough for others so that they 
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each have an opportunity for wellbeing that is at least as valuable as the opportunity for 
wellbeing that one acquires with the appropriation. This version of the proviso holds that those 
with less desirable internal endowments (e.g., those who are less smart, strong, and handsome) 
are permitted to appropriate more than those with more desirable internal endowments.7 Even 
within libertarian theory, then, Nozick’s version of the right to acquired unappropriated things is 
controversial. 
 Consider finally the fourth element in Nozick’s libertarian theory of justice—the right of 
acquisition by transfer. The core idea is that if I have full property rights over a car (which 
includes the right to transfer these rights to others) and you and I each give our free and informed 
consent for those rights to be transferred to you, then those rights are transferred to you. Nozick 
emphasizes that justice depends in part on what contractual agreements have been made and thus 
that no purely end-state (i.e., non-historical) theory of justice can be adequate. He further claims 
(pp. 155-64) that the relevance of contractual agreements shows that no adequate theory of 
justice—even if historical—can be patterned in the sense of requiring (resources or wellbeing) to 
be distributed in accordance with some specified pattern of features. The pattern might, for 
example, be equality (which is not historical) or moral desert (which is historical, given that it 
requires that rewards match desert from past actions). We shall now briefly examine his famous 
Wilt Chamberlain argument for this claim. 
Nozick asks us to consider a hypothetical case in which resources are distributed in 
accordance with our preferred pattern (e.g., equality or in proportion to moral merit) and Wilt 
Chamberlain (a famous basketball star in the 1960s and early 1970s) signs a contract with his 
team according to which he gets 25 cents for each home-game ticket sold. Because he plays so 
well, the team owner freely agrees to this deal. At the end of the season, Wilt has earned an extra 
$250,000 and is much richer than everyone else. Nozick claims that such informed and free 
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contractual agreements preserve justice in the sense that, if the original situation was just, then so 
is the situation that results from such agreements (and no other influences). Consequently, if we 
stipulate that there were no other relevant influences, the resulting situation must be just—given 
our assumption that the original one was. Justice, Nozick claims, is procedural: if one starts with 
a just situation and applies just steps, the result must be just. The crucial point here is that, given 
(according to Nozick) that transfers of rights in conformance with free and informed contracts 
are just steps, the resulting situation will generally not be in accordance with the specified pattern 
(e.g., equality or proportional to merit). Hence, contractual agreements—and the rights to 
transfer and to acquire by transfer that make them possible—are incompatible with a patterned 
theory of justice. Given that individuals surely have the right to engage in contractual 
agreements, no pattern can be maintained without unjustly restricting people’s liberty. Thus, no 
patterned theory of justice is, he claims, plausible. 
 This is an important argument, but there are several ways of resisting the conclusion, and 
I shall mention two. First, if Wilt’s initial earning power is significantly greater than that of 
others, the initial situation might include a very high head tax for him that would equalize 
opportunities for earnings8. Wilt would thus be free to earn lots of money playing basketball, but 
he would also have an enforceable duty to pay high taxes based on his earning power. This 
would be a kind of historical patterned principle (initial equality opportunity for earnings) in 
which contractual agreements preserve justice. It is not, however, the kind of patterned theory 
that Nozick was targeting, since it only imposes the pattern on the initial situation and not on 
later situations. A second way of resisting Nozick’s conclusion is to note that he presupposes that 
Wilt has full rights of acquisition by transfer, which preclude any taxation of transfers. One 
could, however, endorse less than full rights of acquisition by transfer, and these could make 
transfers subject to whatever taxation is necessary to preserve the specified pattern. Thus, Wilt 
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would be free to make contracts, but he would know that they may generate a tax bill. Obviously, 
the issue is complex, and I am here merely flagging aspects of the argument that have been 
challenged.9  
 In sum, Nozick insightfully articulates and motivates a right-libertarian theory of justice, 
but does not provide a systematic defense. His discussion does, however, provide a powerful 
case for thinking that an adequate theory of justice must be historical by being sensitive to what 
wrong-doings took place in the past and to what agreements were made. 
 We are now ready—finally—to turn to the central topic of Anarchy, State, and Utopia: 
the possibility of a state being legitimate without the consent of all those governed. 
 
4. The argument for the legitimacy of the minimal state 
A state, recall, is a coercive organization that has, for a given territory, an effective monopoly on the 
use of force. A state is legitimate just in case its use (via its agents) of force (and threat thereof) is 
typically morally permissible. There is no puzzle about how, according to certain 
consequentialist theories, a state could be legitimate without the consent of those governed. It is, 
however, quite puzzling how a state could be legitimate without the consent of all those 
governed—if one assumes (as Nozick’s libertarianism does) that individuals initially fully own 
themselves. Such rights protect holders from the use of force by others and give them rights to 
use force to protect those rights. If individuals do not lose those rights, then any coercive 
organization that claims a monopoly on the use of force is illegitimate. If Nozick can answer the 
anarchist challenge and show that—even assuming initial full self-ownership—a state can be 
legitimate without the consent of all those governed, this will be significant indeed. 
 Nozick offers an account of how, starting from a state of nature, a legitimate state could 
arise through an invisible hand process (i.e., without anyone intending this result) and without 
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violating anyone’s rights. In a state of nature, each individual fully owns herself and typically 
has other rights as well.10 These rights include the right to enforce these rights by using force to 
stop others from violating those rights, to extract compensation when they do, and perhaps to 
punish violators.11 With the consent of the right-holder, others may assist in this enforcement. It 
would thus be natural for individuals to form mutual protection associations in which they 
commit to helping each other enforce their rights. This could lead naturally to individuals hiring 
private protection agencies to enforce their rights, and this in turn could lead naturally (e.g., 
because of economic efficiencies) to there being a single dominant protection agency. Nozick 
argues, as we shall see below, that such a single dominant protection agency can be a state, 
indeed a legitimate one. 
 In order for a dominant protection agency to be a state, it must have an effective 
monopoly on the use of force in its territory. This means that (1) it prohibits everyone in the 
territory from using force in ways that it has not authorized, and uses force against those who 
violate this dictate, (2) it is effective in getting individuals to comply with these prohibitions 
(e.g., they comply in part because it has so dictated), and (3) it is the only organization or 
individual that is effective in this way. The question is whether a dominant protection agency can 
have these features without violating anyone’s rights. It’s important to note that not everyone in 
the given territory need be a (fee-paying) client of the dominant protection agency. Some 
individuals may be clients of smaller protection agencies and some may not be clients of any 
protection agency. We must consider both the rights of those who are clients of the dominant 
protection agency and the rights of those who are not. 
There will be no violation of the rights of clients, as long as their contracts with the 
protection agency require them to transfer all their enforcement rights to the agency. Indeed, 
such an arrangement will typically be efficient, since it will reduce retaliation and counter-
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retaliation between individuals. Clients, we may thus suppose, voluntarily give up their 
enforcement rights as part of the contract with their protection agency.12 
 The difficult case concerns the dominant protection agency’s enforced prohibition against 
the use of non-authorized force against its clients by non-clients. Given that non-clients have not 
voluntarily given up their enforcement rights, this appears to be a violation of their rights. There 
is no problem when the protection agency uses force to stop a non-client from wrongly applying 
his enforcement rights against an innocent client. Here the non-client has no right to use force 
and is violating the client’s rights. The problem arises when a non-client reliably and fairly 
applies appropriate force against a guilty client (e.g. to prevent a rights violation, to extract 
compensation, or punish, for one). Nozick claims that in a state of nature each individual has the 
right to use force to stop others from using unreliable or unfair enforcement mechanisms against 
herself. For example, I may use force to resist your attempt to forcibly extract compensation 
from me, or punish me, for a rights-violation that I did not commit. Moreover, I may also, in 
such a case, use force to resist being tried by a corrupt and biased jury that you hand-picked to 
assess whether I am guilty. If each client transfers this right to the dominant protection agency, 
then that agency may use force against anyone—even non-clients—who attempts to use 
unreliable or unfair enforcement mechanisms against its clients. 
 The net result is that, although the dominant protection agency does not claim any 
monopoly on the right to use force against those using unfair or unreliable enforcement 
mechanisms (since non-clients also have the same rights), only the dominant protection agency 
has the power to impose its own views on what is fair and reliable. It claims something close to a 
de facto monopoly on the use of force, even though it does not make any claim to a de jure (i.e., 
as a matter of right) monopoly. It prohibits everyone in the territory—clients and non-clients— 
from using force against its clients except in accordance with its own rules.13 Moreover, because 
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the dominant protection agency effectively rules the territory, it has (and not merely claims) a 
something close to a de facto monopoly on the use of force. 
 Nozick argues that the dominant protection agency is not yet a state, but it can naturally 
evolve into one. It is not a state, he claims, because it does not protect everyone in its territory. 
This is because not everyone need be a client of the dominant protection agency, and those who 
are not clients are not protected. It’s not clear to me that a coercive organization needs to protect 
all in a given territory in order to be a state. The crucial problem concerns who counts as part of 
the “all”. Many historical “states” have offered minimal protection to slaves and women. Of 
course, most have offered at least some protection, but, even if they offered no protection, they 
would still seem to be states (although illegitimate ones). For the sake of argument, however, let 
us grant this requirement and consider how Nozick believes it will be met. 
 The crucial issue for Nozick concerns the justness of the dominant protection agency 
prohibiting—with a threat of force—non-clients from using enforcement procedures, which the 
agency has not authorized, against clients. There is no problem with prohibiting them from using 
procedures that will definitely violate the rights of clients. The problem arises when the 
prohibited enforcement procedure is merely risky in the sense that there is a less than certain 
chance that it will result in injustice. Nozick has an extremely interesting and important 
discussion of the issues that arise in this case, but we shall have to limit ourselves to the big 
picture. He argues roughly that it is permissible to prohibit risky activities where those activities 
would generate a general fear in the population even if it were known that compensation would 
always be provided to those whose rights were violated. The crucial point here is that he further 
argues that, if a protection agency prohibits non-clients from using risky enforcement 
procedures, it must compensate them for any disadvantage this imposes. This is what he calls 
“the Principle of Compensation” (p. 82). The cheapest and most effective way of providing this 
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compensation is to provide protection services to the non-clients at a reduced price (reduced by 
the amount of compensation owed). Of course, the non-clients are free to decline those services, 
but given that those services also protect them against other non-clients, there will be a strong 
tendency to accept the protective services.14 
Thus, something approaching universal protection will be achieved by the dominant 
protection agency. The dominant protection agency will be a state. Moreover, it can, Nozick 
claims, arise without violating anyone’s rights, and thus can be legitimate. We shall now briefly 
review the key steps in this argument. 
 One point to note is that Nozick’s account of how a state could arise without violating 
anyone’s rights does not establish that any existing state is legitimate. As Nozick emphasizes, 
justice and legitimacy are historical, and the legitimacy of a state depends at least in part on how 
it actually arose. The mere fact that a state could be legitimate does little to show that any actual 
state is legitimate. It would, however, show that anarchism is mistaken to hold that no state can 
be legitimate without the consent of all those governed. Given that this is Nozick’s focus, the 
hypothetical nature of his account is not a problem. (Admittedly, Nozick sometimes writes, and 
has been interpreted, as if he claims that his hypothetical account could justify an existing state 
not having that history. So things are not perfectly clear in this regard. See pp. 292-294.) 
A more important issue concerns whether Nozick has indeed established that a state can 
arise without violating anyone’s rights. Clearly, there is no violation of rights when individuals 
voluntarily contract with a protection agency. They may agree to pay certain fees (taxes) and 
give up their enforcement rights as part of such agreements. The crucial question concerns non-
clients, that is, those who do not contract with the protection agency. After all, even moderate 
anarchists agree that a state can be legitimate if everyone it governs consents to its powers. 
Nozick argues that the dominant protection agency violates no one’s rights when it prohibits—
15 
and uses force to stop—non-clients from using enforcement procedures that it deems unfair or 
unreliable (provided that it provides appropriate compensation). I shall now argue that is not so.  
Consider two examples: (1) Prior Restraint: Suppose that I am perfectly innocent of 
violating anyone’s rights, and you wrongfully attempt to rob me. Suppose that I use the 
minimum force necessary to stop you and that this merely involves pushing you to the ground 
and running away. (2) Restitution: Suppose that I am perfectly innocent of violating anyone’s 
rights and that you have wrongfully robbed me of my wallet. Later I see you on the street with 
my wallet and after careful observation confirm that it is mine. I then gently strike your hand, 
grab my wallet, and run away. In both these cases, I claim, I have a right (at least on the 
libertarian view) to use these enforcement procedures (of prior restraint and of restitution) and I 
violate no one’s rights in using them. Is Nozick correct that the dominant protection agency does 
not violate my rights if it prohibits me—as a non-client—from using these procedures, as long as 
appropriate compensation is paid? I claim that he is mistaken on this issue. 
According to Nozick (pp. 102-103), the crucial issue is whether the dominant protection 
agency has enough information about my enforcement procedure to establish that it is reliable 
and fair. If it does, then, Nozick rightly claims, it may not prohibit my use of it. Nozick further 
claims, however, that the dominant protection agency may prohibit my enforcement procedure 
when the agency does not have enough information to establish that it is reliable and fair. This 
seems mistaken. Suppose that my enforcement procedure is reliable and fair and that I am in fact 
applying it appropriately against a guilty party (e.g., as in the above examples). The dominant 
protection agency will not deem my enforcement procedure reliable and fair (e.g., because of 
lack of information), but in this case it is. I am fully within my rights to use them, and the agency 
violates my rights if it uses force against me in response to my doing so. This remains true even 
if I am compensated for such interference. Of course, as Nozick emphasizes, the protection 
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agency has to act on the basis of its own judgements, and thus, if it deems my enforcement 
procedures unreliable or unfair, it will deem it morally permissible for it to use of force in 
response to it. The crucial point is that the agency may be mistaken, and, where it is, it violates 
the rights of those whose just enforcement procedures it prohibits—even if compensation is paid. 
 In sum, the crucial question that Nozick addresses is how a state could be legitimate 
without the consent of all of those it governs. The crucial move that Nozick makes to answer this 
question is that, prior to any contractual agreements, each individual is permitted (as long as 
appropriate compensation is paid) to use force to stop others from using enforcement procedures 
that he/she deems unfair or unreliable. Where there is a single dominant protection agency 
representing individuals, it is also so permitted on behalf of its clients. I have suggested, 
however, that Nozick is mistaken that individuals and protection agencies violate no rights when 
they mistakenly use force to stop someone from using an enforcement procedure that is in fact 
fair and reliable. If this is so, Nozick’s argument for the possibility of a state arising without the 
consent of all and without violating rights succeeds only if the dominant protection agency 
approves of all enforcement procedures that are in fact reliable and fair. Given the limitations of 
human knowledge, this is extremely unlikely. It could happen by chance, but it is not practically 
possible in the sense that we could reasonably ensure that it is so. 
 Not all is lost, however. The legitimacy of the state, as I have defined it, requires that the 
state’s use of force be typically permissible. This allows that a state can be legitimate without 
being perfect. It may be enough to meet this test that the state scrupulously (e.g., as carefully as 
can reasonably be expected of anyone) (1) gather information about what enforcement 
procedures are reliable and fair, (2) approve all for which there is strong evidence that they are 
reliable and fair, and (3) be suitably cautious about using force against non-clients where the 
evidence is murky. Thus, Nozick’s argument may well show that a state can be legitimate 
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without the consent of all those governed, even if he does not show that a state could arise in 
practice without violating anyone’s rights.  
 
5. The argument for the illegitimacy of the more than the night-watchman state. 
The argument so far has concerned protection agencies, which by definition restrict their 
activities to protecting their clients against having their rights violated. If Nozick’s argument 
succeeds, it establishes the possibility of the legitimacy of a minimal state, which is a state that 
restricts its activities to protecting the rights of its citizens. A minimal state, however, need not 
be a night-watchman state, which (following Nozick) is a state that restricts its role to protecting 
its citizens against violence, theft, fraud, and breach of contract. Because Nozick holds a right-
libertarian theory of justice, he equates the minimal state (which protects all natural rights) with 
the night-watchman state (which protects only the right-libertarian rights). If, however, 
individuals have more natural rights than right-libertarianism recognizes (e.g., a right to adequate 
nutrition or basic health care), then his argument, if successful, shows that more than a night-
watchman state can be legitimate. The dominant protection agency can permissibly use force 
(even against non-clients) to ensure that individuals fulfill their duties (e.g., to provide adequate 
nutrition) to clients. 
Nozick argues, however, that nothing more than a night-watchman state can be 
legitimate. If he is right, then none of the following state activities are legitimate: (1) promoting 
impersonal goods (i.e., goods, such as perhaps great art or cultural artifacts, that are intrinsically 
valuable for their own sake and not merely good for any individuals); (2) providing paternalistic 
protection (i.e., protecting individuals against themselves; e.g., by prohibiting drug use or 
requiring retirement savings); (3) aiding the disadvantaged (e.g., the poor); and (4) promoting 
the wellbeing of all by overcoming market-failures (i.e., providing goods and services that the 
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market cannot provide in a cost-effective manner). 
 Nozick argues that nothing more than the night-watchman state is legitimate on the basis 
of his right-libertarian theory of justice. Given that individuals typically fully own themselves 
and various external things, they have no duty to provide personal services (i.e., labor) or pay 
taxes (i.e., part with some of their wealth) for the above state activities. Moreover, they have a 
right against others—including agents of the state—that they not be forced to provide such 
personal services or pay such taxes. Of course, protection agencies might branch out, provide 
such services, and contractually require their clients to provide such personal services or pay fees 
for them. This is perfectly legitimate (although few individuals may sign up for such services). 
The problem concerns non-clients. It would clearly violate the rights of non-clients to impose 
such requirements. 
Nothing more extensive than the night-watchman state is justified on the right-libertarian 
view.15 The least controversial component of this view is probably the view that it is illegitimate 
for the state (or anyone) to coercively require individuals to provide aid for the promotion of 
impersonal goods (i.e., goods that are good in themselves, as opposed to good for individuals). 
Although many people think that it is legitimate, for example, for the state to promote the arts, it 
is usually because they believe the arts are good for at least some of the citizens. It is relatively 
(but not completely) uncontroversial that coercion is not permissible merely to promote 
impersonal goods. 
Somewhat more controversial is the idea that the state may not restrict people’s freedom 
in order to protect them from themselves (i.e., for the state to engage in paternalism). Although 
many people think that it is legitimate for the state to prohibit recreational drug use and to 
require people to make payments to a retirement savings plan, this is often at least in part to 
protect third parties. For example, if drug use leads to crime and poor retired people are typically 
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looked after by others, then such regulations may protect citizens from the costs of other people’s 
choices. Thus, part of the rationale for many seemingly paternalistic laws is the protection of the 
interests of others. When one considers purely paternalistic state restrictions, many people agree 
with right-libertarianism that such restrictions are illegitimate. The state should leave people free 
to live their lives as they choose as long as they are not violating the rights (or otherwise 
harming) others. 
Much more controversial is right-libertarianism’s claim that it is illegitimate for the state 
to require individuals to provide aid to the disadvantaged. Of course, the legitimacy of the state 
requiring citizens to aid others depends on exactly on what is required. The easiest case to defend 
is one where the state imposes only a small tax on those who are very rich and uses it to ensure 
merely that everyone has an adequate opportunity to obtain the most basic nutrition, shelter, and 
health care. Such aid might, for example, be provided to young orphans and those severely 
disabled through no fault of their own. Right-libertarianism rejects even such minimal taxation 
for meeting the very basic needs of others, but most people think that some such taxation is 
legitimate. 
The most controversial right-libertarian claim in this context is the claim that it is 
illegitimate for the state to provide goods and services that benefit everyone and that the market 
does not provide efficiently or effectively. Of course, there is much controversy about which 
goods can be provided effectively by the market and about the role of the state in providing those 
that are not so provided. Most people, however, would agree that it is legitimate to provide goods 
and services that make everyone better off than he/she would be without state provision. Right-
libertarianism, however, denies the legitimacy of such a role for the state. 
It is important to note that the state can require citizens to provide aid for the above kinds 
of activities in two distinct ways. One is to require citizens to provide personal services (e.g., 
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serve in the military or serve on a jury). The other is to require citizens to contribute money or 
other external resources (e.g., to pay for the military or court services). Right-libertarianism is on 
its firmest ground when it rejects the legitimacy of the state requiring personal services for the 
above activities and on its weakest ground when it rejects the legitimacy of the state requiring the 
payment of taxes to fund the above activities. The personal freedom and security of full self-
ownership is much easier to defend than the freedom from taxation provided by full property 
rights in external things.  
Putting all this together, we can say that right-libertarianism is on relatively firm ground 
in its rejection of the legitimacy of (1) any state requirement to provide personal services to 
promote a purely impersonal good, and (2) any state prohibition of activities that do not violate 
the rights or otherwise harm others. Right-libertarianism is, however, on relative weak ground in 
its rejection of the legitimacy of state taxation to (1) provide for the very basic needs of the most 
vulnerable members of society (e.g., children and the severely disabled), and (2) make 
everyone’s life better by providing goods and services that the market does not provide 
effectively. 
In sum, right-libertarianism may be right that individuals fully own themselves and thus 
that it is illegitimate for the state to limit their freedom by requiring them to provide personal 
services for the above kinds of state activities. Right-libertarianism’s view that individuals can 
acquire full private property in external things—which rules out any taxation—is much more 
controversial. Almost everyone agree that individuals can acquire robust private property in 
external things, but most would reject the view that such rights are so strong that they preclude 
all forms of taxation. If this view is correct, then more than the minimal night-watchman state is 
legitimate. 
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6. Conclusion 
Nozick’s defense of the possibility of the legitimacy of the state assumes the rights of full self-
ownership (including enforcement rights). This makes Nozick’s task particularly difficult, and 
establishing the possibility of a legitimate state from such a starting point would be a significant 
result. Nozick’s defense of the impossibility of the legitimacy of any state more extensive than 
the night-watchman state without the consent of all governed, however, assumes right-
libertarianism’s commitment to full property rights in external things, and this makes Nozick’s 
task particularly easy. It rules out the possibility that individuals have an enforceable duty to pay 
any taxes to promote any social goals. Given that this view is subject to powerful objections, the 
significance of the second argument is very limited.16 
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1
 Nozick initially (e.g., p. 23) says that the state claims a monopoly on the use of force, but he 
later (pp. 117-18) modifies this to it having a de facto monopoly on the use of force. 
2
 Two other uses of “justice” are (1) as distributive fairness, and (2) as what we owe others. 
Authors have tended not to keep these three senses distinct. 
3
 An owner’s right to use a thing is, of course, constrained by the rights of others in other things. 
Thus, for example, my right to use the baseball bat that I fully own does not permit me to smash 
your car with it. 
4
 Nozick lays out his theory of justice in Ch. 7, section 1. Unlike most libertarian authors, he 
does not typically use the term “self-ownership”. His invocation and discussion of rights against 
violence (as well as theft and fraud) makes clear, however, that he invokes full self-ownership. 
Note also that full ownership of one’s self or of a thing includes enforcement (rectification) 
rights and thus these rights need not be mentioned separately (as Nozick does). 
5
 Locke also imposes a non-spoilage condition that limits one’s property rights to what one can 
use prior to it spoiling, but Nozick does not invoke this condition. 
6
 In the text, I interpret Nozick as holding that a particular appropriation is just as long it leaves 
no one worse off than non-appropriation in that case. Nozick sometimes writes, however, as if 
the proviso is satisfied as long as the general practice/system of appropriation leaves no one 
worse off than he/she would be if everything were to remain in the common use. This latter 
approach factors in the benefits and costs of the appropriation of other things by other agents. 
This appeal to a general practice/system, however, does not fit well with Nozick’s general 
libertarian framework, and I here ignore it. 
7
 For an introduction to left-libertarianism, see Vallentyne and Steiner (2000a, 2000b). 
8
 A head tax on earning power is of course incompatible with full self-ownership. The point here 
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is simply that it can be part of a (historical) patterned principle that respects whatever valid 
contractual agreements people make. 
9
 See, for example, Fried (1995) and various essays in Cohen (1995). 
10
 It’s important to note that Nozick’s argument for the possible legitimacy of the state assumes 
full self-ownership but does not assume any of the other right-libertarian property rights (in 
external things). The crucial issue concerns the use of force against a person. 
11
 Nozick assumes that there is a right to punish, but, following Barnett (1998), I believe that a 
plausible version of libertarianism will not include such a right (e.g., because it limits losses of 
self-ownership to what is necessary to prevent or compensate rights violations). It will instead 
limit the use of force to prior restraint and compensation extraction. In what follows, I shall 
therefore typically focus on those two enforcement rights, but the points extend to punishment as 
well. 
12
 On p. 15, Nozick notes that protection agencies might not require clients to transfer over all 
enforcement rights. They might simply refuse to offer any protection after authorized self-
enforcement is used by a client. When he discusses the dominant protection agency, however, he 
assumes that all enforcement rights have been transferred to the agency. Otherwise, the agency 
would not claim a monopoly on the use of force. 
13
 The dominant protection agency does not literally claim a de facto monopoly on the use of 
force, because it does not prohibit the use of force by non-clients against non-clients. Thus, 
Nozick seems to be assuming that the state only needs to claim something close to a de facto 
monopoly on the use of force. 
14
 It’s worth noting that, if all non-clients accept the protective services at the reduced rates, then 
there is a sense in which the legitimacy of the resulting state is grounded in a kind of consent. In 
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this case, it’s not entirely clear that the scenario rebuts moderate anarchism. Still, as long as one 
person does rejects the offer of protective services at a reduced rate, moderate anarchism will, if 
the argument is successful, be rebutted. 
15
 Nozick does provide an account in Ch. 9 (Demoktesis) of how something like the extensive 
modern democratic state could arise and be legitimate. Roughly, the story involves everyone 
selling shares in themselves and their property so that eventually (e.g., for efficiency reasons) 
everyone has one share in each person and each thing. As shareholders, they then collectively 
decide on how the country will be run. This is not a counterexample to Nozick’s claim that no 
state more extensive than the night-watchman state can be legitimate without the consent of all 
governed, since in this case everyone consents. The critical issue—which Nozick discusses but 
does not resolve—concerns how those who have not so consented—such as people born later—
are to be handled. 
16
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